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TOWN OF TELLURIDE V. SAN MIGUEL VALLEY CORP.:
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND LOCAL AUTONOMY
RICHARD BRIFFAULT
INTRODUCTION
At first blush, the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Town
of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.1 seems like an extraordinary
endorsement of home rule and a significant milestone in the evolution of
local power. The Colorado Supreme Court adopted a very broad con-
struction of the power of a home rule municipality under the state consti-
tution2 and invalidated a state statute that expressly sought to limit that
power.3 The power in question---extraterritorial eminent domain-seems
to go well beyond even the most generous assumptions about local gov-
ernment authority. As the uproar following the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London4 reminds us, a growing
concern about local governments trenching on property rights has made
eminent domain increasingly controversial. More importantly, extrater-
ritorial eminent domain would appear to be precisely the subject that is
beyond the ordinary scope of local autonomy. As by definition it has
extra-local effects, extraterritorial eminent domain seems to be a matter
that ought to be subject to state control. Putting to one side the question
of whether the Colorado Supreme Court correctly interpreted its state
constitution, Telluride looks like one of the greatest judicial vindications
that home rule-and the goal of strong local self-government that under-
lies home rule-has ever received.
In this Article, I challenge the assumption that Telluride is a striking
advance for either home rule in particular or local autonomy more gener-
ally. Extraterritorial authority in general, and extraterritorial eminent
domain in particular, is neither novel nor particularly linked to home
rule. Although extraterritorial eminent domain surely strengthens the
municipality authorized to use it, such a municipal action potentially
challenges the autonomy of other local governments. Indeed, it can un-
dermine the model of local self-determination usually associated with
strong home rule. Extraterritorial eminent domain ultimately relies on
the older (and continuing) notion of local government as an agent or arm
t Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
1. 185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008).
2. Id. at 164.
3. Id. at 169.
4. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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of the state for its legitimacy. 5 As I shall indicate, early and mid-
twentieth century commentators looked to state delegation as the source
of local power to act extraterritorially, and the more the value of local
self-government becomes the foundation for home rule, the more prob-
lematic municipal extraterritorial action becomes.6
More generally, extraterritoriality reveals the problematic nature of
local autonomy in the contemporary United States. With most urban
areas composed of dozens, if not hundreds, of local governments-and
few, if any, local governments fully encompassing their economic and
social regions-local governments inevitably have needs which cannot
be satisfied entirely within their borders and inevitably undertake actions
which affect people outside their boundaries.7 External effects cannot be
avoided, yet the fact that nonresidents who do not participate in local
elections and are not part of the local community are directly affected by
local government actions challenges the local self-government ideal that
drives the quest for local autonomy. The autonomy of one locality can
be fully legitimate only when it takes into account the interests of its
neighbors or is coordinated with the other local governments that
represent those neighbors' interests. Yet, the mechanisms for interlocal
coordination-and for increasing local accountability to the extralocal
residents affected by local actions-also necessarily constrain local au-
tonomy.
8
This article consists of three parts. The first draws on older cases
and academic commentary to examine the surprisingly well-established
recognition of municipal extraterritorial action in American local gov-
ernment law. The next part then considers the interplay between extra-
territoriality and the two dominant theories of local government-local
government as agent or delegate of the state, and local government as
representative of local people. As I have already suggested, even when
extraterritorial power grows out of a home rule grant, extraterritorial
action-particularly coercive forms of municipal action like eminent
domain-is more closely tied to the state delegate than the home rule
ideal of strong local self-government. The final part concludes by as-
sessing the relationship between extraterritoriality and interlocal rela-
tions. Extraterritorial power is important because the land and resources
within municipal boundaries are frequently inadequate to meet municipal
residents' needs, and territorial expansion may be legally (or politically)
unavailable or unlikely to meet those needs. Yet extraterritorial actions
5. Cf Costco Wholesale Corp. v. City of Beaverton, 161 P.3d 926, 931 (Or. 2007) ("[1]t is
legislative, and not home rule, authority that a city exercises when it acts extraterritorially.").
6. See, e.g., David E. Hunt, Comment, The Constitutionality of the Exercise of Extraterri-
torial Powers by Municipalities, 45 U. CHi. L. REv. 151, 151-57 (1977).
7. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1115, 1130-34 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BuFF. L. REv. 1 (2000).
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have direct implications for the self-governance of the locality's neigh-
bors. Some supralocal mechanism is necessary to reconcile the extrater-
ritoriality that may be necessary for effective local self-government with
the political accountability that provides the democratic legitimacy that is
also necessary for local self-government. Although that mechanism need
not involve the state directly, it will have to impose some limitations on
the autonomy of some local governments in order to protect the autono-
my of others and the democratic nature of the local government system
as a whole.
I. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL TRADITION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Local government power is closely associated with local bounda-
ries. Local governments are elected by voters who reside within local
boundaries; they are financed primarily by taxes collected on land, in-
come, or activities within local boundaries; they provide services to
people, firms, and landowners primarily within local boundaries; and
their regulatory activities are primarily focused on people, businesses,
and land within local boundaries. 9 The significance of local boundaries
for basic aspects of local governance drives the often intense conflicts
over the rules and procedures for municipal incorporation, annexation,
consolidation, and other forms of boundary change.
Yet, American local governments have long engaged in extraterri-
torial activities and have long wielded extraterritorial power. Under the
Dongan Charter of 1686, New York was authorized to acquire "a burial
place 'without the Gate of the Citty [sic],"" 0 and the Baltimore Charter
of 1796 gave that city quarantine jurisdiction three miles beyond the city
limits and authority over navigation four miles outside the city." In
1853, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the authority of the city of
Philadelphia to acquire land for a railroad outside the city, 12 and in 1885,
the New York Court of Appeals upheld the authority of New York City
to condemn land for a public park outside the city limits in nearby West-
chester County. 13 Nor was extraterritorial authority limited to big cities
or metropolitan centers. In 1869, Kentucky's highest court upheld the
authority of the town of Falmouth to regulate liquor sales and taverns,
and to charge a licensing fee within a one mile extraterritorial zone sur-
rounding the town.1
4
9. See generally RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
STATE AND LOCAL GOvERNmENT LAW 174-93 (7th ed. 2009).
10. RUSSELL WEBBER MADDOX, EXTRATERRrrORIAL POwERs OF MUNICWPALrmES IN THE
UNITED STATES 8 (1955).
11. Id.
12. See Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 174-75 (1853).
13. In re Mayor of New York, 2 N.E. 642, 652-53 (N.Y. 1885).
14. Bd. of Trs. of Falmouth v. Watson, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 660, 661-62 (1869).
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These early exercises of extraterritorial authority, and their multiple
contemporary equivalents, can be grouped into several categories. First,
and most common, cities were long able to go beyond their borders to
purchase goods and services needed for municipal operations and to ac-
quire, operate, and maintain physical infrastructure necessary for the
health, safety, and well-being of their residents. As a 1928 Harvard Law
Review Note explained, "[elfficiency in the performance of municipal
functions often requires the acquisition and administration of property
outside the corporate limits .... ,1 For well over a century, many muni-
cipalities have obtained and controlled extraterritorial water supplies and
water systems; sewage disposal and drainage facilities; electric, gas, and
other power plants and transmission systems; parks and recreational fa-
cilities; and transportation systems, such as roads, bridges, and, in the
twentieth century, airports.
1 6
Sometimes this was because the necessary resource-the water
supply-was simply located beyond municipal borders. As one early
twentieth century political scientist noted, "[w]ithin the restricted limits
of their ordinary boundaries, cities are frequently unable to find certain
materials and substances which are essential to the provision of the ordi-
nary municipal services. Of these, perhaps the first in importance is an
adequate and satisfactory water supply. 1 7 Similarly, a city which begins
a bridge or road or drainage ditch within its borders may have no choice
but to continue the structure extraterritorially if it is to fulfill its transpor-
tation or waste removal function.18 More commonly, however, extrater-
ritorial acquisition and operation was less a matter of municipal necessity
and more a matter of convenience: from the municipal perspective, the
best place for certain undesirable forms of infrastructure needed to serve
the municipality-such as sewers, drains, cemeteries, and quarantine
stationsl9-might be outside the city limits.
Second, municipalities frequently sell goods and services-water,
gas, and electric power, sewage and waste removal-to residents, busi-
nesses, or other local governments located outside the city limits.
20
Courts and commentators have justified this as a means for the munici-
pality to profit from its excess capacity; as a form of protection of the
health of the residents of the municipality from sanitary problems on the
urban fringe; and as a means of developing areas that are potential targets
15. Note, Extraterritorial Powers of Municipalities, 41 HARV. L. REv. 894, 895 (1928).
16. See, e.g., MADDOX, supra note 10, at 10-21 (water and sewage), 22-32 (utilities and
transportation facilities), 51-57 (airports and parks); William Anderson, The Extraterritorial Powers
of Cities, 10 MiNN. L. REv. 475,482-95 (1926).
17. Anderson, supra note 16, at 482.
18. Id. at 487-92.
19. Id. at 486, 495.
20. See MADDOX, supra note 10, at 15-18 (extraterritorial sale of water), 27-29 (sale of pow-
er); FRANK S. SENGSTOCK, EXTRATERRrrORIAL POWERS IN THE METROPOLrrAN AREA 16-25 (1962)
(sale of utility services).
1314 [Vol. 86:4
2009] EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND LOCAL AUTONOMY
for future annexation efforts.21 Certainly, when extraterritorial service
delivery could be shown to benefit the local government's residents,
22
courts generally have had little difficulty upholding such local action.
Owning, operating, and selling the products of physical infrastruc-
ture are not inherently governmental. Virtually all of these facilities have
private sector counterparts, so that municipal waterworks or power plants
may be seen as falling on the "proprietary" side of the proprie-
tary/governmental divide and, thus, may pose less of a challenge to the
notion that local governments' governmental or coercive powers are ter-
ritorially limited.23
However, the third major form of extraterritorial action-police
power regulation of people, land, or designated activities-involves
clearly governmental activity and is in tension with the idea that "the
principal purpose of setting municipal boundaries is to set a territorial
limit to the city's governmental powers." 24  Although not the norm,
extraterritorial local police power is surprisingly widespread. Sometimes
the extraterritorial police power is connected to the extraterritorial facili-
ties already mentioned. For example, local governments may have been
able to prohibit the contamination of the extraterritorial water supply,25
or to regulate land uses in the immediate vicinity of the extraterritorial
airport in order to enhance aviation safety.26 More commonly, munici-
palities engage in extraterritorial regulation to protect their residents
from harms originating just across the city's borders, such as the stench
from slaughterhouses or tanneries, the danger of blasts from stored ex-
plosives, air pollution from smokestacks, and the moral pollution from
dram shops and liquor sales. These powers may also be seen as part of
the future orderly development of the community, or as a means of pro-
viding basic police services to residents of the extraterritorial area.
Extraterritorial regulatory authority is typically limited to certain le-
gal categories of municipalities, or targeted on specific activities, or tied
to specific territorially-defined zones, or restricted to specific powers,
such as the power to prevent nuisances, impose quarantines, or regulate
the subdivision of land.27 Certain powers, like taxation, are very rarely
21. SENGSTOCK, supra note 20, at 21-22; see also City of N. Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Reg'l
Utils., 829 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind. 2005).
22. See, e.g., Vill. of Orland Hills v. Citizens Utils. Co. of Ill., 807 N.E.2d 590 (111. App. Ct.
2004); GTE Nw. Inc. v. Or. Pub. Utils. Conm'n, 39 P.3d 201 (Or. CL App. 2002).
23. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 482 (referring to water, sewage, and other utilities
as "business powers"); cf. DeFazio v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. 679 P.2d 1316, 1338 (Or.
1984) (explaining that the fact that city engages in extraterritorial contracts or "other consensual
transactions in goods or services" has little relevance to the question of whether the city can exert
"coercive authority over people or property beyond its boundaries").
24. Anderson, supra note 16, at 572.
25. MADDOx, supra note 10, at 10, 13.
26. Id. at51.
27. See, e.g., Louis F. Bartelt, Jr., Extraterritorial Zoning: Reflections on its Validity, 32
NOTRE DAME LAW. 367, 386 (1957).
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wielded extraterritorially. Some courts have found broad grants of extra-
territorial authority troublesome,28 and extraterritorial regulatory authori-
ty typically has to be express, and not implied. But, notwithstanding the
tension with the idea of local government as territorially limited govern-
ment, some extraterritorial police power has long existed and continues
to be found in most states.29
Finally, extraterritorial authority has long included eminent domain.
Although eminent domain seems like the most coercive and therefore the
most governmental power of all, early commentators thought about it
primarily in terms of its connection to the proprietary power of operating
physical infrastructure to provide necessary goods and services, rather
than as a form of police power. According to William Anderson, the
author of the leading 1925 study of municipal extraterritoriality,
The eminent domain cases give us least trouble of all. If it be once
conceded that water supplies, parks, and similar facilities are for pub-
lic purposes, and even for municipal purposes although located out-
side of city limits, then there can be little legal objection to the use of
condemnation proceedings in the furtherance of the public purpose.
30
Similarly, a study undertaken by a scholar at Oregon State College
thirty years after Anderson's work found that extraterritorial eminent
domain was frequently used to obtain land for water supply facilities,
sewage and garbage disposal plants, and other utilities.31 Although typi-
cally the authority for extraterritorial eminent domain was explicitly pro-
vided by constitutional provision or statute, courts on occasion were will-
ing to imply it by combining the authority to acquire land externally with
the power to condemn land internally.32 Even today, when most courts
require that extraterritorial condemnation authority be expressly granted,
at least some find it implicit in the power to acquire land to construct or
maintain key infrastructure facilities.33
Although in the discussions of extraterritorial police and condemna-
tion authority I have distinguished between express and implied powers,
I have so far not said much about the source of this local government
power. As with all local powers, extraterritorial authority has to be
traced back to some grant from the state, whether in the state constitu-
tion, a general enabling statute, a home rule provision (constitutional or
statutory), a specific statutory grant, or a state-issued charter. There is no
inherent right of local self-government in American local government
28. See Malone v. Williams, 103 S.W. 798, 804-06 (Tenn. 1907).
29. See Hunt, supra note 6, at 151-57.
30. Anderson, supra note 16, at 564.
31. MADDOX, supra note 10, at 2, 11, 24.
32. Id. at 11, 24, 83; Anderson, supra note 16, at 564-65.
33. See, e.g., Kelley v. City of Griffin, 359 S.E.2d 644, 645-46 (Ga. 1987).
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law,34 and all local powers-even home rule powers--derive from the
state. In Telluride, for example, the Colorado Supreme Court's vindica-
tion of the power of extraterritorial eminent domain emerged out of an
interpretation of the home rule article of the state constitution,35 not a
claim of any inherent power of extraterritorial eminent domain. The
state source of this local power tells us that key state decision-makers-
constitution writers and ratifiers, legislatures, and courts-have long
concluded that due to the lack of fit between local boundaries and local
needs effective local government requires extraterritorial action on some
occasions and for some purposes. Local authority need not be inherent
in order to be powerful. As the next section suggests, however, different
views of the nature of local government can affect the type and scope of
the extraterritorial powers granted.
II. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE LEGAL THEORY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
American local government law has evolved as a dialectic between
two competing theories of local government: local government as dele-
gate of the state, and local government as a democratically accountable
36
representative of its local constituency. In effect, a local government is
an agent of two principals-the state that creates it, defines its bounda-
ries, and vests it with public powers, and the local people who elect (and
can vote out) local officials and whose health, safety and welfare are the
touchstone of local action. Local government as arm-of-the-state has
long been the dominant legal model reflected in constitutional doctrine,3 7
a host of state cases, and academic criticism. 38 Local government as
"American polis"39 has also had a long, if subordinate, tradition, as indi-
cated by the expanded, even if still limited, scope of local home rule,4°
occasional controls on state legislation targeting localities,41 and federal
constitutional protection for the rights of local residents to vote in local
elections. 42 Local government as arm-of-the-state continues to be the
blackletter law in virtually all states, and state governments generally
prevail in state-local conflicts. But the growing state constitutional, leg-
islative, and judicial respect for the local democratic roots of local self-
34. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 278-81.
35. Town of Telluride v. San Miguiel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 164-69 (Colo. 2008).
36. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 70-144. A third model of local govern-
ment-local government as quasi-proprietary firm-applies primarily to special districts and special
purpose governments, and not to general purpose governments like counties or municipalities. See
id. at 147-73.
37. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907).
38. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1059, 1062
(1980).
39. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 98-146.
40. Seeid. at 314-449.
41. See id. at 281-314.
42. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970); Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474,480 (1968).
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government has resulted in greater attention to the value of local auton-
omy in local government law.
This has had a somewhat paradoxical consequence for the legitima-
cy, if not the legality, of extraterritorial local government action. Al-
though state measures granting local governments extraterritorial au-
thority would seem to reflect a growing valuation of local power and of
the local role in providing services and meeting the needs of local resi-
dents, in fact the rise of the polis model has created difficulties for local
extraterritoriality, particularly coercive extraterritorial measures like po-
lice power regulation and eminent domain.
When local power is seen as state-delegated power, extraterritoriali-
ty presents few conceptual problems. Formally, the only question is
whether the extraterritorial power has been delegated. The lack of repre-
sentation of residents of the extraterritorial area in the government of the
local government acting territorially is not a problem since the acting
locality is merely an agent of the state and the extraterritorial residents
are deemed to "have given their consent though their representatives in
the [state] legislature. ' 'A3
As the 1928 Harvard Law Review Note explained,
[T]he delegation of such [extraterritorial] powers would seem unim-
peachable, for the municipal corporation would exist solely for the
purpose of carrying on locally the government of the state. When,
therefore, it is deemed convenient to carry out that purpose by grant-
ing extraterritorial powers to a particular municipality, individuals
without its boundaries cannot complain; in theory they are being con-
trolled, not by their neighbors' representatives, but by the state
through its functionaries.4
4
Similarly, in early-twentieth-century political scientist William An-
derson's view the rejection of the doctrine of an inherent right of local
self-government undermined the conceptual basis for any challenge to
even very broad grants of extraterritorial police power. With the state as
the font of all local power, extraterritorial regulation was not on any
weaker legal footing than internal municipal action:
If we bear in mind.., that the city acts in governmental matters only
as the agent of the state, and that it has no power to act governmen-
tally either within or without its ordinary boundaries without state
legislative authorization, we can properly argue that the act is, how-
ever indirectly, the act of the state legislature, in which all residents
of the state have representation. If the consent of the governed is a
43. Otis J. Bouwsma, The Validity of Extraterritorial Municipal Zoning, 8 VAND. L. REv.
806, 814 (1955).
44. Note, supra note 15, at 897-98.
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prerequisite to a valid act of legislation, that consent has been given
by the voters' representatives in the legislature.45
To be sure, some early court decisions found broad extraterritorial
police power troubling; the notion of local government accountability for
its actions to local people had some purchase on legal thinking even
when it was rejected as doctrine.46 Broad extraterritorial regulatory au-
thority was (and remains) relatively unusual. But, until at least the mid-
dle of the twentieth century, most local government law scholars had
little difficulty with local extraterritorial regulation as a matter of legal
theory. Indeed, the arm-of-the-state model was repeatedly invoked to
justify the application of extraterritorial regulation to land use planning,
zoning, and subdivision controls to enable cities to deal with the boom-
ing suburbanization beyond their corporate borders. 47
That easy acceptance of local extraterritorial action began to change
as the conceptual basis for local power began to evolve and more weight
was given to local government as representative of, and accountable to,
local residents. Frank Sengstock's 1962 study of extraterritorial powers
for the University of Michigan Law School had little difficulty with the
extraterritorial purchase of land for utility purposes or the sale of utility
services to nonresidents, but was quite troubled by extraterritorial police
power regulations as these had the effect of imposing government with-
out representation. The idea that nonresidents on the urban fringe had a
voice in extraterritorial municipal action through their representatives at
the state level began to seem less persuasive to some commentators, who
concluded that "[t]he condition that extraterritorial power constitute[s]
government without the consent of the governed is the chief and fatal
weakness in using such powers. ''4  Limited extraterritorial regulation
might be expedient as a temporary solution to the governance needs of
growing fringe areas, but a broad grant of police power was seen as
"treading on dangerous grounds ' '49 and an "unwarrantable interference
with local government in fringe communities.,
50
The Supreme Court's application of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to apportionment systems and to limits on
the right to vote in local elections bolstered the view of local government
as agent of its people. As the Court explained in 1968 in Avery v. Mid-
land County51 when it applied the "one person, one vote" doctrine to
local elections, "in providing for the governments of their cities, coun-
45. Anderson, supra note 16, at 581.
46. See, e.g., Malone v. Williams, 103 S.W. 798 (Tenn. 1907).
47. See, e.g., MADDOX, supra note 10, at 80-82; Bartelt, supra note 27; Bouwsma, supra note
43.
48. SENGSTOCK, supra note 20, at 72.
49. Id. at 50-51.
50. Id. at 72.
51. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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ties, towns, and districts, the States characteristically provided for repre-
sentative government-for decision making at the local level by repre-
sentatives elected by the people., 52 Even a properly apportioned state
legislature cannot authorize a local governance structure that violates the
one person, one vote requirement.53 Nor can a state legislature chosen by
an electorate properly composed of adult resident citizens authorize local
government elections (at least the elections of general purpose local gov-
ernments like cities or counties) in which the electorate is limited to, or
skewed in favor of, taxpayers or property owners. 54 The Court has re-
jected the notion that the locally underrepresented or disenfranchised
have consented to these rules through their participation in the election of
the state legislature that adopted these voting arrangements and that has
the power to change them. "Government-National, State, and local-
must grant to each citizen the equal protection of its laws, which includes
",55an equal opportunity to influence the election of its lawmakers ....
Accordingly, as commentators in the 1970s recognized, Avery and its
progeny threatened the viability of municipal extraterritorial regulation.
Relying on "[m]odern equal protection developments," the author of a
University of Chicago Law Review Note concluded in 1977 that "all but
de minimis forms of extraterritorial control are in danger of invalida-
1,56tion.
In fact, in the year after that Note was published, municipal extrater-
ritorial regulation received its most significant constitutional challenge.
Extraterritorial action was upheld, however, but only because the Su-
preme Court re-emphasized the state-delegate roots of local authority. In
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,5 7 a divided Supreme Court re-
jected the claim that an Alabama law entrusting municipalities with a
population of 6,000 or more with "police jurisdiction" over a three-mile
extraterritorial zone around those cities violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
In particular, the Court noted, the extraterritorial power did not in-
clude "the vital and traditional authorities of cities and towns to levy ad
valorem taxes, invoke the power of eminent domain, and zone property
for various types of uses."5  As a result, the extraterritorial residents did
not bear the same relationship to the Tuscaloosa government as the city
52. Id. at 481.
53. See id at 491.
54. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 300-01 (1975); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.
204, 213 (1970). Limiting the electorate to special constituencies like taxpayers or land owners may
be permissible in elections for the governments of special limited purpose districts. See, e.g., Ball v.
James, 451 U.S. 355, 370-71 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719,728 (1973).
55. Avery, 390 U.S. at 481 n.6.
56. Hunt, supra note 6, at 178-79.
57. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
58. Id. at 72 n.8.
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residents, so denying the municipal vote to the former while extending it
to the latter did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Holt Civic Club then went on to affirm and acknowledge the legiti-
macy of some extraterritorial governance and, in so doing, embraced the
vision of local governments as agents of the states that created them.
59
The Court emphasized the wide extent of extraterritorial arrangements,
how many of these involved the granting of "more extensive or intrusive
powers over bordering areas" than conferred by Alabama, including zon-
ing,60 and how reluctant it was to intrude into an area traditionally left to
the states. Most importantly, the Court implicitly invoked the older ar-
gument that surrounding area residents consented to extraterritorial regu-
lation through their representatives at the state level. In response to ar-
guments that there are arrangements other than extraterritorial municipal
action for providing basic police regulation on the urban fringe that
would be more representative or accountable to the residents of the extra-
territorial zone, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that "[a]uthority to make
those judgments resides in the state legislature, and Alabama citizens are
free to urge their proposals to that body."6' Justice Stevens, in his con-
curring opinion, underscored that the Alabama legislature "is elected by
all of the citizens of the State including the individual appellants. 62
In Holt Civic Club, extraterritoriality was seen as a mechanism
created by the state to enable Tuscaloosa and other cities to deal with
health and safety issues just beyond their borders and to provide some
basic governance for those fringe areas. The democratic legitimacy of
this action was satisfied by the state legislature's representation of the
residents of the extraterritorial zone, although the legitimacy need was
also seen as mitigated by the relatively limited scope of municipal extra-
territorial power.
Contemporary extraterritorial cases reflect the mixed consequences
of Avery and Holt and, more generally, the efforts of state courts and
legislatures to hold together the arm-of-the-state and local self-
government ideas. Extraterritorial regulation, including both police
power health and safety measures and eminent domain, have been autho-
rized by legislatures and upheld by courts. Often, courts refer to either
the municipal need for extra-local action to meet important municipal
concerns like water supply, waste removal, and parks, or to the municipal
interest in regulating conditions, such as the form of land development,
in fringe and potential growth areas. Many contemporary decisions seem
ambivalent about extraterritoriality. Looking to the state-delegation
59. See id at 71 (citing Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178(1907)).
60. Id. at 72; see also id. at 72 n.8.
61. Id. at 74.
62. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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roots of municipal extraterritorial action,63 courts have little difficulty
with the ultimate question of whether states may authorize municipalities
to act extraterritorially. Nonetheless, courts often appear troubled by
extraterritorial action.
Courts frequently require that the grant of extraterritorial authority
be express,64 and they are likely to resolve cases of uncertainty or ambi-
guity against the locality claiming extraterritorial power.65 Extraterritori-
al actions may draw closer judicial scrutiny. In California, for example,
courts are required to defer to the judgment of the local legislature with
respect to the necessity of a taking within local boundaries, but are, in
contrast, required to review the need for an extraterritorial condemna-
tion.66
A central theme in these cases is the challenge that coercive extra-
territorial action poses for the local self-government principle in the
extraterritorial area. Courts have emphasized that consensual or contrac-
tual extraterritorial measures-the sale of services, for example-pose
little difficulty because they do not involve any coercion of those not
represented in local elections.67 But more coercive measures are seen as
troublesome from a local democracy perspective.
Coercive extraterritorial actions threaten both the extralocal indi-
viduals subject to the locality's regulation and the collective interest of
the people of the extraterritorial area in governing themselves. A Cali-
fornia court looked to the first interest in explaining the different legisla-
tively-prescribed standards of review for internal and external eminent
domain actions. When engaged in an internal taking, a local government
will be politically "accountable to ... property owners and ... taxpay-
ers" affected, but such accountability is missing for an extraterritorial
taking.68 As a result, under California law a reviewing court ought to be
less deferential to a municipality's claim that a condemnation is neces-
sary to achieve its goals when it is taking land beyond its borders, as
opposed to land within the city limits.
Similarly, courts have expressed concern about the interlocal conse-
quences of extralocal action. As an Ohio court explained in denying a
municipality the right to apply its zoning ordinance extraterritorially in
the absence of express state authorization, "[aillowing one city to pass
63. See, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp. v. City of Beaverton, 161 P.3d 926, 931 (Or. 2007)
("[It is legislative, and not home rule, authority that a city exercises when it acts extraterritorially.");
Philip v. Daley, 790 N.E.2d 961, 969 (111. App. Ct. 2003); St. Andrews Pub. Serv. Dist. Comm'n v.
Comm'rs of Pub. Works of Charleston, 344 S.E.2d 857,858-59 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
64. See, e.g., Seigles, Inc. v. City of St. Charles, 849 N.E.2d 456, 458 (11. App. Ct. 2006).
65. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Harnish, 150 P.3d 245, 249-50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); Ken-
neth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
66. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Keck, 92 Cal. Rptr. 599, 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
67. See, e.g., GTE Nw. Inc. v. Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 39 P.3d 201,208 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
68. Keck, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
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laws which affect residents of another jurisdiction would cause signifi-
cant animosity and unnecessary litigation .... Obviously, harmony of
standards in adjoining areas is desirable, and cities should co-operate to
achieve the best results for all.... [But] one jurisdiction cannot impose
its will on another."69 Other courts have noted the difficulties of coordi-
nating extraterritorial eminent domain with the land use regulations of
the communities in which the extraterritorial action occurs, a problem
which is exacerbated when the home rule vision requires that both locali-
ties be treated as "co-ordinate sovereign[s]."70 The Telluride decision is
less striking for its affirmation of municipal extraterritorial eminent do-
main-such action is authorized in many states and upheld by many
courts-than for its apparent lack of concern about the democratic legi-
timacy question posed by municipal extraterritorial action.
III. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE INTERLOCAL SETrING
Extraterritorial municipal action, particularly regulation of residents
in the extraterritorial area who are not authorized to vote in municipal
elections, is not only an extension of the theory of local self-government
but is also a problem for it. The need for extraterritorial action grows out
of the lack of fit between ordinary local authority and the scope of local
needs and concerns. Many localities are simply too small to address all
their requirements within their boundaries, yet they may be unable or
unwilling to expand the size of their cities. Moreover, the authority for
extraterritorial action is not inherent in local power but comes as a dele-
gation from the state. Indeed, the lack of consent of the "extraterritorial
governed" and the need to coordinate the actions of overlapping local
governments would be serious problems for a theory of extraterritoriality
rooted in local self-government. But these concerns diminish somewhat
when local powers are seen as deriving from the state government, which
is both accountable to a statewide electorate (including those in extrater-
ritorial zones) and has the power to coordinate the actions and policies of
adjacent local governments.
Given the contemporary power of the local autonomy model in
shaping both popular and legal thinking about local government-even if
the state-delegation model remains formally dominant doctrinally-
extraterritorial action, particularly coercive measures like eminent do-
main, necessarily seems problematic. As I suggested, extraterritoriality
raises two distinct, albeit related, difficulties. First, there is the political
accountability problem; that is, the question of regulation without equal
69. Tatco Dev., Ltd. v. Montgomery County, No. 18387, 2001 WL 28674, at *6 (Ohio CL
App. Jan. 12, 2001).
70. City of Scottsdale v. Mun. Court, 368 P.2d 637, 643 (Ariz. 1962); see also Valley Twp. v.
City of Coatesville, 894 A.2d 885, 889-90 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (discussing interaction of extra-
territorial eminent domain and subdivision controls of community in which eminent domain power
was exercised).
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representation of those regulated in the political process of the govern-
ment doing the regulating. Although this has probably received more
attention from academics troubled about extraterritorial municipal ac-
tion,71 I think the more serious issue, particularly when eminent domain
is at stake, is the second problem-the potential for interlocal conflict.
Most instances of municipal regulatory authority, apart from eminent
domain, involve municipal action in unincorporated areas, rather than in
other formally organized localities. There is unlikely to be much of a
clash between governmental policies when a municipality acts extraterri-
torially in an unincorporated area. Moreover, extraterritorial regulation
may actually benefit the extraterritorial area by providing basic police,
fire, and health protections to fringe area residents at relatively low cost
to them.72 In addition, Holt Civic Club indicates there is an outer bound
on how far a municipality can regulate beyond its borders without trig-
gering constitutional protection, particularly the right to vote in munici-
pal elections, for residents of the extraterritorial area.
But extraterritorial eminent domain authority can, and often is, ex-
ercised within incorporated municipalities. This means that one munici-
pality may be taking from another the decision concerning how a specific
parcel of land is to be used. This can be a direct challenge to the zoning,
planning, or land use policies of the host locality. Indeed, given that
counties or townships in some states enjoy planning or zoning powers
over unincorporated areas, the interlocal conflict over land use policy
provoked by eminent domain can occur even with respect to the con-
demnation of land in an unincorporated area. Extraterritorial regulation
of individuals may raise questions about the democratic basis of local
action, but extraterritorial eminent domain can generate a conflict be-
tween local governments, each of which has formal legal authority over
the same parcel of land and each of which is pursuing a different vision
of the proper use of that parcel as part its quest for local self-
determination. This makes the potential for conflict between extraterrito-
riality and local self-government in the eminent domain setting especial-
ly pointed.
States have not been unaware of this clash of local powers and local
governments when one is acting extraterritorially within the borders of
the other. Some states expressly provide by law which actor prevails
when a conflict occurs.73 Courts have sometimes sought to deal with
these problems by interpreting the powers in question to avoid a direct
71. For a recent and particularly fevered example, see Ryan A. Kriegshauser, Note, E.T. Take
Home: The Out-of-This-World Rationale for Extraterritorial Takings and Ignoring Their Inherent
Conflict with the Fifth Amendnent, 73 UMKC L REv. 925, 935 (2007).
72. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 74 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Ware v. Henry County Water & Sewerage Auth., 575 S.E.2d 654, 780 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2002).
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conflict.74 But, however the matter is addressed, some rule or procedure
is necessary to accommodate the competing goals of the affected local
governments. That resolution is going to require some determination at
the state level, whether by general rule or on a case-by-case basis, and
whether by an administrative agency (which could be a regional body), a
court, the legislature, or the state constitution.
The Telluride decision seems to recognize the need for some state
action to deal with interlocal conflict. The majority opinion notes that
although the legislature may not prohibit extraterritorial eminent domain,
"it may regulate the exercise of those powers."75 The point was made
more explicitly by Justice Coats who, in his concurring opinion, empha-
sized that "the state has a cognizable interest in regulating the acquisition
of property, beyond their own boundaries, by so many home rule ci-
ties. While neither the majority nor the concurrence stated what the
statewide interest would be, surely the state has an interest in protecting
the land use regulatory authority and, more broadly, the policy-making
autonomy of the local governments in which extraterritorially con-
demned land is located.
Where the Telluride Court may have erred is in summarily treating
the Colorado law in question as a prohibition and not a regulation. Colo-
rado Revised Statute § 38-1-101(4)(b) conditions extraterritorial eminent
domain for parks and open space on the "consent of both the owner of
the property to be acquired by condemnation and the governing body of
the local government in which territorial boundaries the property is lo-
cated." Although requiring the consent of the landowner is tantamount
to a prohibition-the whole point of eminent domain is to permit the
government to take property without the owner's consent-the require-
ment of the consent of the host local government should have been
treated as a regulation and not a prohibition. It is not antithetical to the
idea of eminent domain in the way that a requirement of landowner con-
sent would be, and it provides a means of harmonizing the policies of the
taking and host communities. The requirement of host community con-
sent is a feature of the laws of some states that permit extraterritorial
action.77 Indeed, Pennsylvania recently adopted such a requirement in
the aftermath of a court decision that allowed an extraterritorial condem-
nation in apparent violation of the subdivision controls of the host locali-
ty.
78
74. See, e.g., Kenneth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 570 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992); City of N. Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Reg'l Utils., 829 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind. 2005); Valley
Twp., 894 A.2d at 890; Provo City v. Ivie, 94 P.3d 206, 209 (Utah 2004).
75. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 170 n.8 (Colo. 2008).
76. Id. at 172.
77. See, e.g., Provo, 94 P.3d at 211.
78. See Brian P. Gregg, Comment, Valley Township v. City of Coatesville: The Future of
Extraterritorial Takings, 17 WIDENER L.J. 629, 636-37 (2008).
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The Telluride Court may have failed to adequately consider the le-
gitimate interest of the host community in the case before it because the
only objection to the taking came from the property owner. Indeed, the
host community, San Miguel County, endorsed Telluride's action and
filed an amicus brief that supported the condemnation. The land in ques-
tion was literally at Telluride's doorstep, and the park and open space
planned by Telluride would have benefitted San Miguel County, too. As
a result, the issue of whether state legislation could seek to harmonize the
interests of the host locality with those of the municipality engaged in
extraterritorial eminent domain was not squarely presented. Neverthe-
less, Telluride struck down all of subsection (4)(b), not just the landown-
er rights component. Given San Miguel County's support for Telluride,
the court's action was unnecessary to resolve the question presented by
the case. More importantly, it may constrain the state's ability to coordi-
nate interlocal relations in future extraterritorial eminent domain situa-
tions.
To be sure, the court may not have erred after all. It could be ar-
gued that the requirement of host community consent is tantamount to a
prohibition. Although many academic advocates of local autonomy have
expressed doubts about greater state oversight of local actions as a means
of addressing the external effects of local decisions, and have instead
suggested that interlocal contracts, interlocal agreements, and, more gen-
erally, interlocal collaboration is the way to go,79 the requirement of host
locality consent could indeed prove to be an absolute barrier to extraterri-
torial action. Neighboring communities do not always get along, and
consent may be denied because of "local pride and envy," the bad blood
accumulated from past conflicts, disagreement over how to divide the
benefits from a project, or a myriad of other bargaining difficulties.8 0 If
the host locality actually exercises its power to veto, then the requirement
of consent would operate as a prohibition.
Perhaps the prohibition/regulation distinction could be addressed by
revising state law so that the host locality's veto would be subject to
judicial or administrative review on some sort of reasonableness or best-
interests-of-the-entire-area standard. Or perhaps the taking locality could
be required to obtain the consent of a regional land use body which
would include representatives of the taking locality, the host locality, and
other affected adjacent localities. Alternatively, the state might not give
the host locality a veto but, instead, make it more difficult for the taking
locality to act if the host locality objects. A bill currently pending in the
Colorado legislature, for example, provides that if the host locality ob-
jects to the proposed condemnation the taking community can act only if
79. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv.
190, 191 (2001).
80. Minor Myers III, Obstacles to Bargaining Between Local Governments: The Case of West
Haven and Orange, Connecticut, 37 URB. LAW. 853, 854 (2005).
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a supermajority of its governing body votes for the action and that in any
judicial review of the taking, the condemning government must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the proposed public use of the
property outweighs the benefits of other planned or potential uses of the
property by the host locality or the landowner. Of course, if the state
supreme court concludes that the possibility that an entity-whether the
host locality, a reviewing court, or a regional agency--could deny per-
mission for the extraterritorial condemnation constitutes a prohibition
rather than a regulation, then the only way to assure that extraterritorial
eminent domain accommodates the interests of host localities would be a
state constitutional amendment.
But without some way of taking into account the interests of the
host locality, the Colorado Supreme Court's Telluride analysis would
have the effect of preferring the extraterritorial power of some local gov-
ernments over the internal regulatory authority of others in the name of
home rule. That does not seem to make sense from either the perspective
of local government as delegate of the state or from the perspective of
local government as grass-roots democracy.
CONCLUSION
Reconciling extraterritorial eminent domain with the land use regu-
lations and other policies of host localities is simply one facet of a broad-
er question-indeed, perhaps the central question facing American local
government law today-which is how to make sense of local autonomy
in a world in which large numbers of small localities divide up shared
economic, social, or topographical areas. Local government needs can-
not be satisfied entirely within local borders. Local government regula-
tory actions, as well as tax and service delivery decisions, inevitably
have extralocal effects. Local governments are agents of their people,
but they affect the lives of people beyond their borders who do not par-
ticipate in local governance. The more autonomy local governments
enjoy the more difficult the problem is likely to become, as the more
actions local governments are able to take the more impacts they will
have on other localities and on nonresidents.
To some extent these issues can be addressed by voluntary interloc-
al agreements, joint ventures, and councils of government. But the more
we speak of the rights and powers of local governments-including the
right not to cooperate with neighbors-the more difficult it will likely be
to resolve these issues at the local level. Ultimately, state action will be
necessary to accommodate different local interests, to harmonize inter-
local conflicts, and to provide rules and procedures for resolving inter-
local disputes. This could involve regional rather than statewide bodies,
as well as courts and administrative agencies, in addition to, or instead
of, the state legislature. But whichever of these many alternative forms it
takes, state regulation will be necessary to make local autonomy effec-
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tive and legitimate. That is especially likely when local autonomy entails
the formal projection of local government beyond local borders onto land
subject to the jurisdiction of other localities.
As a result, the Telluride decision and extraterritorial eminent do-
main more generally suggest that a great paradox is at the heart of local
government law: At least some reliance on the model of local govern-
ment as delegate of the state will be necessary to legitimate the actions of
local government as a locally elected representative of local people. Or
perhaps this is not a paradox at all, but instead a resolution of the great
ann-of-the-state/local autonomy divide that has been central to contem-
porary legal academic debates about local government law.
